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WHAT IS THE RELEVANT PARCEL? 
CLARIFYING THE “PARCEL AS A 
WHOLE” STANDARD IN MURR V. 
WISCONSIN 
GAVIN S. FRISCH* 
INTRODUCTION 
“If there is a consensus today about regulatory takings law, it is that 
it is highly muddled.”1 Much of this “muddle” results from the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New 
York,2 which requires courts to analyze takings claims using a three-
part, ad hoc test that measures the extent of the property owner’s loss 
against the value of the “parcel as a whole.”3 In subsequent decisions, 
the Court has repeated the Penn Central rule but has provided minimal 
guidance for lower courts, furthering confusion in the realm of 
regulatory takings law.4 Notably, the Court has failed to announce a 
rule for determining the “parcel as a whole.”5 As a result of this lack of 
clarity, lower courts have been “invited to engage in open-ended value 
judgments.”6 
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 1.  John E. Fee, The Takings Clause as a Comparative Right, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003, 1006 
(2003). 
 2.  438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 3.  See Brief of the Cato Institute and Owners’ Counsel of America as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners at 6–12, Murr v. Wisconsin, 136 S. Ct. 890 (2016) (No. 15-214) [hereinafter 
Brief of the Cato Institute]. 
 4.  John D. Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 171, 
171–72 (2005). 
 5.  See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 
533 U.S. 606 (2001); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 
302 (2002). These are examples of regulatory takings cases in which the Court considered the 
“parcel as a whole” but declined to elaborate a specific rule. 
 6.  See Brief of the Cato Institute, supra note 3, at 9 (quoting J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments 
for the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89, 104 (1995)). 
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With lower courts formulating their own tests, property owners 
have largely been unsuccessful in their challenges, losing approximately 
ninety percent of takings claims.7 An example of these unsuccessful 
takings claimants is the case of Joseph, Donna, Michael, and Peggy 
Murr (collectively “the Murrs”), owners of two adjacent properties 
along the St. Croix River.8 The Murrs have spent years combating local 
and state authorities in a quest to renovate their riverside cabin and sell 
their adjacent property, but the Wisconsin courts have consistently 
ruled against them.9 
Despite their repeated failures, the Murrs have a chance to 
persuade the Court that Penn Central’s “parcel as a whole” concept 
needs further clarification for lower courts to implement it effectively. 
During the 2016-2017 term, the Court will decide whether, in a 
regulatory takings case, the “parcel as a whole” concept as described in 
Penn Central establishes a rule that two legally distinct but commonly 
owned contiguous parcels must be combined for takings analysis 
purposes.10 
This commentary will first set forth the factual and procedural 
history behind the Murrs’ takings claim. Second, there will be a brief 
discussion of takings jurisprudence. Part III details the lower court’s 
holding in the Murrs’ takings claim. Part IV analyzes the claim to 
identify the party that should prevail. Finally, the commentary will 
conclude briefly with the expected outcome of the case. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The Murrs’ parents purchased two parcels of land on the St. Croix 
River in 1960 and 1963—each parcel approximately one and one-
quarter acre in area.11 On the first lot (Lot F), the parents built a cabin 
near the river and transferred the title to their plumbing company.12 
Three  years  later,  they  purchased  the  second  lot  (Lot E), which has  
 
 7.  F. Patrick Hubbard et al., Do Owners Have a Fair Chance of Prevailing Under the Ad 
Hoc Regulatory Takings Test of Penn Central Transportation Company?, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y F. 121, 141 (2003). 
 8.  Murr v. State, No. 2013AP2828, 2014 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1041, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. 
2014). 
 9.  See id.; see also Murr v. St. Croix Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 796 N.W.2d 837 (Wis. Ct. App. 
2011).  
 10.  Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits at i, Murr v. Wisconsin, 136 S. Ct. 890 (2016) (No. 15-
214) [hereinafter Petitioners’ Brief]. 
 11.  Murr, 796 N.W.2d at 841. 
 12.  Id. 
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remained vacant ever since.13 In 1994 and 1995, respectively, the parents 
transferred Lot F and Lot E (collectively “the Lots”) to the Murrs, with 
the second transfer bringing the Lots under the Murrs’ common 
ownership.14 
After flooding from the river damaged the cabin, the Murrs wanted 
to reconstruct the cabin on higher ground and requested six variances 
and two special exception permits from the St. Croix County Board of 
Adjustment (“Board”).15 Planning to sell Lot E to finance construction 
on Lot F, one of the variances sought the Board’s approval to use Lot 
E and Lot F as separate building sites.16 While the Lots were legally 
distinct properties, they were effectively merged under a 1976 St. Croix 
County ordinance (“Ordinance”) that was enacted to comply with 
federal and state laws designating the St. Croix River as part of the 
National Wild and Scenic River System.17 The Ordinance required that 
adjacent substandard lots in common ownership contain at least one 
acre of buildable area in order to be sold or developed as separate lots.18 
While the Murrs owned a total of 2.5 acres, the buildable area of Lot E 
is only 0.5 acres and the buildable area of Lot F is 0.48 acres.19 
After a public hearing, the Board denied all eight variances and the 
Murrs sought certiorari review before the circuit court.20 The circuit 
court affirmed the Board’s denial of the Murrs’ request to use Lot E 
and Lot F as separate building sites but reversed the Board on the 
remaining seven requests.21 The Murrs appealed and the Board cross-
appealed the circuit court’s decision.22 The Murrs argued that the Lots 
were exempt from the Ordinance because the Lots were not under 
common ownership when the Ordinance was enacted.23 Rejecting the 
Murrs’ interpretation of the Ordinance, a three-judge panel on the 
Wisconsin  Court  of  Appeals  upheld  the  Board’s  denial  of  all eight  
 
 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. at 842. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. at 841. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. at 840. 
 23.  Id. at 843. 
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requests.24 The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied the Murrs request for 
an appeal.25 
The Murrs decided to take a different approach and filed a new 
complaint in circuit court against the State of Wisconsin (“State”) and 
St. Croix County (“County”).26 The Murrs alleged that the Ordinance 
resulted in a taking without just compensation under Section Thirteen 
of Article One of Wisconsin’s Constitution because the Ordinance 
deprived the Murrs of “all, or practically all, of the use of Lot E.”27 The 
State and County separately moved for summary judgment, but 
essentially set forth the same four arguments.28 
The circuit court granted summary judgment for the State and 
County,29 but took an unusual approach. After concluding that the 
Murrs’ claim was time barred, the circuit court nevertheless reached the 
merits of the takings challenge.30 The circuit court determined that 
regulatory takings law required an analysis of the Ordinance’s effect on 
the Murrs’ property “as a whole” instead of each individual lot.31  
Noting that the Murrs could build a cabin located entirely on either lot 
or straddled across both of the Lots, as well as the fact that the 
combined properties retained significant value, the circuit court 
concluded that there was no compensable taking.32 
On appeal, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit 
court by rejecting the Murrs’ takings claim as a matter of law.33 Without 
reaching the issue of whether the Murrs’ claim was time barred, the 
Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected the Murrs’ argument that there 
was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the contiguous Lots 
were used together such that they could be considered as one property 
for regulatory takings analysis.34 Despite the existence of a statutory 
procedure for modifying the boundaries of real property lots, the 
Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that the Ordinance effectively 
merged  the  Murrs’  Lots  but  did  not  deprive  the  Murrs  of  all  or   
 
 24.  Id. at 844–45. 
 25.  Murr v. St. Croix Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 803 N.W.2d 849 (Wis. 2011). 
 26.  Murr v. State, No. 2013AP2828, 2014 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1041, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. 
2014). 
 27.  Id. at *5–6. 
 28.  Id. at *6–7. 
 29.  Id. at *7. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. at *7–8. 
 33.  Id. at *8. 
 34.  Id. at *14–15. 
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substantially all practical use of the combined property.35  Once again, 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied further review.36 
On August 14, 2015, the Murrs filed a petition for a writ of certiorari 
to the Supreme Court.37 On January 15, 2016, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to determine whether in a regulatory takings case the 
“parcel as a whole” concept establishes a rule that two legally distinct 
but commonly owned contiguous parcels must be combined for takings 
analysis purposes.38 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Fifth Amendment Takings Clause & Penn Central 
The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause states that “private 
property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”39 The Takings Clause largely “operates as a conditional 
limitation, permitting the government to do what it wants so long as it 
pays the charge.”40 This right to just compensation for takings of private 
property has been incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment 
to apply to the states.41 
Until the Supreme Court decided Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon,42 the Court had interpreted the government’s conditional 
requirement to only provide just compensation to physical invasions or 
appropriations of land.43 Mahon extended the conditional requirement 
by holding that a government restriction of the owner’s use of land may 
qualify for just compensation under the Takings Clause.44 Recognizing 
that the government cannot reasonably pay for every change in law 
that  might  diminish  property  values,  Justice  Holmes established the  
 
 
 35.  Id. at *1. 
 36.  Murr v. State, 862 N.W.2d 899 (Wis. 2015). 
 37.  Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 10, at 1. 
 38.  Murr, 2014 Wis. App. LEXIS 1041 (Wis. App. 2014), cert. granted, Murr v. Wisconsin, 
136 S. Ct. 890 (2016). 
 39.  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 40.  Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 487 n.19 (2005) (quoting E. Enters. v. 
Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 545 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part)). 
 41.  See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). 
 42.  260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
 43.  Keith Woffinden, Comment, The Parcel as a Whole: A Presumptive Structural Approach 
for Determining When the Government Has Gone Too Far, 2008 BYU L. REV. 623, 626 (2008). 
 44.  Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415–17. 
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general rule that property may be regulated, yet regulation that goes 
“too far” will constitute a taking.45 
Over half a century after Justice Holmes announced the “too far” 
rule for takings, the Court established a three-part ad hoc test to 
determine if a regulation has gone “too far” in Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. New York City.46 Under the ad hoc test, the Court 
must assess (1) the “economic impact of the regulation,” (2) “the extent 
to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed 
expectations,” and (3) the “character of the government action.”47 
Additionally, Penn Central established the general principle that courts 
must consider the “parcel as a whole” to determine whether the 
government’s action results in a taking.48 In rejecting the appellants’ 
claim that a New York City law effected a taking because the law 
deprived the appellants of the “air rights” above the existing property, 
the Court noted: 
“Taking” jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete 
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular 
segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a 
particular governmental action has effected a taking, [the] Court 
focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature 
and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole. . . 
.49 
The Court held that New York City’s landmark law did not effect a 
taking of the appellant’s “air rights” because it determined that the city 
tax block was the relevant parcel.50 However, the Court failed to 
explain how it determined that the city tax block was “the parcel as a 
whole.”51 
While most takings claims are subject to Penn Central’s ad hoc test, 
the Court has recognized two types of per se takings.52 One type of per 
se taking was recognized in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Corp.,53 where the Court held that a permanent physical occupation of 
private property is a per se taking even if the government’s action only 
 
 45.  Id. at 415–16. 
 46.  438 U.S. 104, 124–28 (1978).  
 47.  Woffiden, supra note 43, at 627 (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124). 
 48.  Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130–31. 
 49.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  See id. at 1030–39. 
 52.  See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992). 
 53.  458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
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has a minimal economic impact on the owner.54 This type of per se 
taking is not relevant to Murr. The second type of per se taking is 
discussed below. 
B.  Lucas & Subsequent Takings Clause Case Law 
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,55 the Court established 
a second category of per se takings, called “total takings.”56 Writing for 
the majority, Justice Scalia held that a governmental action that 
deprives an owner’s property “of all economically beneficial use” 
constitutes a taking “unless the proscribed use interests were not part 
of the title to begin with.”57 While “all economically beneficial use” 
seems to imply a one hundred percent loss of use, the Court left open 
the possibility that the loss of use need not be exactly one hundred 
percent.58 
In footnote seven (“Lucas Footnote Seven”), the majority 
recognized that the total takings rule was difficult to apply by stating 
that “the rule does not make clear the ‘property interest’ against which 
the loss of value is to be measured.”59 Fortunately, the majority 
provided guidance in two key ways.60 First, the majority rejected the 
view adopted by the New York Court of Appeals in Penn Central where 
the court examined the diminution in the parcel’s value “in light of total 
value of the takings claimant’s other holdings in the vicinity.”61 
Additionally, the majority indicated that the relevant parcel can be 
impacted by the owner’s reasonable expectations.62 The majority’s 
determination of the relevant parcel mirrors the second prong of Penn 
Central’s ad hoc test, which considers if the deprivation runs contrary 
to reasonable, investment-backed expectations.63 While the majority 
recognized that state property law shape the expectations of land 
owners, the Court did not resolve the “parcel as a whole” question 
 
 54.  Id. at 434–35. 
 55.  505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 56.  Id. at 1027. 
 57.  Id.  
 58.  Id. at 1016–17 n.7. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  See Woffiden, supra note 43, at 631. 
 61.  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016–17 n.7 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 
N.E.2d 1271, 1276–77 (NY Ct. App. 1977), aff’d, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)). 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Compare id., with Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) 
(the second prong of the ad hoc test requires courts to consider “the extent to which the regulation 
has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations”). 
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because the property owner’s fee simple interest had been deprived of 
all economic value of the lots he owned in the area.64 
A decade after deciding Lucas, the Court in Tahoe-Sierra 
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency65 relied 
on the “parcel as a whole” concept to decide a total takings challenge 
against a construction moratorium for areas surrounding Lake Tahoe.66 
Property owners claimed the moratorium effected a total taking 
because their land was deprived of all economic use for the duration of 
the moratorium.67 The Court rejected the property owners’ argument 
because dividing the property interest up into temporal segments 
“ignor[ed] Penn Central’s admonition that in regulatory takings cases 
we must focus on ‘the parcel as a whole.’”68 The Tahoe-Sierra decision 
provided further guidance to lower courts by stating that an interest in 
real property, and therefore the relevant parcel, is defined by 
geographical and temporal dimensions.69 
III.  HOLDING 
In a per curiam opinion, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed 
the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment, holding that the Murrs 
failed to allege a taking as a matter of law because the Ordinance did 
not deprive the Murrs of all or substantially all of the practical use of 
their property.70 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals determined the 
Murrs’ claim was governed by Zealy v. City of Waukesha,71 state law 
precedent that applied Penn Central’s parcel as a whole concept.72 
Zealy rejected a property owner’s argument that the city effected a 
total taking through regulations that precluded residential 
development on over eighty percent of the owner’s property because 
the property owner retained over two acres zoned for economically 
beneficial use.73 In holding that no compensable taking occurred, Zealy 
noted that “the United States Supreme Court has never endorsed a test 
that ‘segments’ a contiguous property to determine the relevant 
 
 64.  Lucas, 505 U.S.. at 1016–17 n.7. 
 65.  535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
 66.  Id. at 330–32. 
 67.  Id. at 320. 
 68.  Id. at 331 (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130–31). 
 69.  Id. at 331–32 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. §§ 7–9 (1936)).  
 70.  Murr v. State, No. 2013AP2828, 2014 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1041, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. 
2014). 
 71.  201 Wis. 2d 365 (Wis. 1996). 
 72.  Murr, 2014 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1041 at *11–14 (citing Zealy, 201 Wis. 2d at 372). 
 73.  See Zealy, 201 Wis. 2d. at 376–80.  
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parcel.”74 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals interpreted Zealy as setting 
forth “a well-established rule that contiguous property under common 
ownership is considered as a whole regardless of the number of parcels 
contained therein.”75 
In applying Zealy to reach the holding that the Ordinance had not 
effected a compensable taking, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals defined 
the “parcel as a whole” as the combination of Lots E and F.76 The court 
noted that the Ordinance permitted the Murrs to build a new residence 
that “could be located entirely on Lot E, entirely on Lot F, or it could 
straddle both lots.”77 Because the Murrs retained the ability to use the 
combined property as a residential property, the Ordinance did not 
effect a taking that deprived the Murrs of “all or substantially all” of 
the practical use or value of their property.78 Furthermore, the 
Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected the Murrs’ alternative claim of a 
partial taking under the ad hoc inquiry.79 
IV.  ARGUMENTS 
A.  The Murrs’ Arguments 
The Murrs argue that the relevant parcel is Lot E for analyzing the 
effect of the Ordinance either as a per se taking under Lucas or a taking 
based on Penn Central’s ad hoc test.80 The Murrs contend that Supreme 
Court precedent “focuses on the single parcel that comprises the entire 
fee simple interest.”81 
This argument primarily lies in the hints offered by Lucas Footnote 
Seven, where the Supreme Court rejected an approach to determining 
the relevant parcel that aggregates parcels held by the owner within the 
vicinity.82 Lucas hinted that determining the relevant parcel relates to 
“how the owner’s reasonable expectations have been shaped by the 
State’s law of property. . . .”83 Furthermore, Lucas elaborated that the 
“State’s law of property” relevant to the inquiry depends on the degree 
 
 74.  Id. at 375–76. 
 75.  Murr, 2014 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1041, at *13. 
 76.  See id. at *10–15. 
 77.  Id. at *15. 
 78.  Id. at *21. 
 79.  Id. at *16–17.  
 80.  Petitioners’ Reply Brief on the Merits at 2, Murr v. Wisconsin, 136 S. Ct. 890 (2016) (No. 
15-214) [hereinafter Petitioners’ Reply Brief]. 
 81.  Id.  
 82.  Id. at 3. 
 83.  Id. at 5. 
FRISCH WITH MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/2017  8:43 PM 
262 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 12 
of legal recognition and protection accorded by the State’s law “to the 
particular interest in land with respect to which the takings claimant 
alleges and diminution in value.”84 Lucas avoided the difficult issue of 
setting forth a clear “parcel as a whole” rule because the “particular 
interest in land” pled by the takings claimant was a fee simple interest.85 
Like the takings claimant in Lucas, the Murrs assert a taking of a fee 
simple interest.86 
Another argument advanced by the Murrs is that Lot E and Lot F 
have not been legally joined but presently remain as separate, single, 
and discrete parcels.87 This argument attacks the effect of the 
Ordinance by claiming that the Ordinance does not eliminate lot lines 
because Wisconsin has a statutory procedure in place for altering lot 
lines.88 The statutory procedure requires a recorded survey to modify 
the boundaries of any lot, but no recorded survey of Lot E had actually 
taken place.89 Not only were the Lots created as legally separate parcels, 
the Lots were taxed separately until the Wisconsin Court of Appeals 
decided the Murrs’ initial lawsuit against the Board.90 
Additionally, the Murrs argued that the chain of title supported 
their claim that Lot E and Lot F were legally distinct parcels.91 
Specifically, the Murrs’ parents brought Lot E and Lot F under 
common ownership by transferring the title of Lot F from their 
plumbing company to their personal names in 1982.92 Because the 
parents transferred Lot F to the Murrs in 1994 without transferring Lot 
E, the Murrs argue that Lots E and F did not legally become a single 
parcel as the result of common ownership.93 The Murrs further support 
their claim by contending that Wisconsin’s property regulations, 
specifically the Ordinance, does not define the relevant parcel.94 
 
 
 84.  Id.  
 85.  Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016–17 n.7 (1992).  
 86.  Petitioners’ Reply Brief, supra note 80, at 6. 
 87.  Id. at 7. 
 88.  Id. (citing Wis. Stat. § 236 (2015)). 
 89.  Id. at 7–9. 
 90.  See Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 10, at 9; see also Brief for Respondent State of 
Wisconsin at 40–41, Murr v. Wisconsin, 136 S. Ct. 890 (2016) (No. 15-214). 
 91.  Petitioners’ Reply Brief, supra note 80, at 10–11.  
 92.  Id. at 10. 
 93.  Id. at 10–11. 
 94.  See id. at 11–16. 
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B.  St. Croix County & Wisconsin’s Arguments 
The County and State both view the “parcel as a whole” as the 
merger of Lot E and Lot F and contend that the Murrs took title to a 
single merged parcel in 1995 under state law and takings law.95 To 
identify the merged property as the relevant parcel, the State and 
County rely on Lucas Footnote Seven.96 Because Supreme Court 
precedent has routinely defined “property” protected by the Takings 
Clause in the context of state law, the State claims that this approach is 
the correct way to identify the relevant parcel.97 
The State notes that evaluating takings claims with respect to the 
owner’s reasonable expectations in light of state property law is 
particularly useful for evaluating land lots because regulations with 
respect to lot lines are within the realm of state law.98 For example, 
states have the ability to set forth the manner in which lot lines are 
drawn, altered, and merged.99 Not only would this approach respect 
state sovereignty, it would provide an objective test for determining the 
relevant parcel based on ex ante state law.100 This objective test, the 
State claims, would deter manipulative behavior by both states and 
property owners.101 
When applied to the Murrs’ takings claim, the State argues that Lot 
E and Lot F constitute a “parcel as a whole” because the Murrs had an 
objectively reasonable expectation to take title to a single merged 
parcel in 1995 in the context of the State and County’s property laws.102 
Because the Ordinance was in place for nearly twenty years before the 
Murrs took ownerships of the Lots, the Murrs had adequate notice that 
the 1995 transfer would effectively merge Lot E and Lot F.103 Under 
this approach, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals correctly applied Zealy 
 
 95.  Brief for Respondent St. Croix County at 25, Murr, 136 S. Ct. 890 (No. 15-214); Brief for 
Respondent State of Wisconsin, supra note 90, at 1. 
 96.  See Brief for Respondent St. Croix County, supra note 95, at 28; see also Brief for 
Respondent State of Wisconsin, supra note 90, at 23 (stating that the relevant parcel may depend 
on the owner’s reasonable expectations in light of the State’s law of property). 
 97.  Brief for Respondent State of Wisconsin, supra note 90, at 29–30. 
 98.  Id. at 24. 
 99.  Id. at 33–34. 
 100.  Id. at 35–36. 
 101.  Id. at 36–37 (contending, for example, that under an objective standard, an unexpected 
change in a state’s property law without a grandfather clause to protect owners’ expectations 
under ex ante state law would give rise to a takings challenge against the state’s change). 
 102.  Id. at 37–38. 
 103.  Brief for Respondent St. Croix County, supra note 95, at 34–35; Brief for Respondent 
State of Wisconsin, supra note 90, at 44. 
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to the Murrs’ request to segment their merged property into two 
separate parcels for evaluating their takings claim.104 
If the Supreme Court determines that a multi-factor approach is 
better than the State’s approach to determining the relevant parcel, the 
State argues that the merged property is still the relevant parcel.105 The 
State claims that the Murrs had no “economic expectations” as a matter 
of law to treat Lot E separately from Lot F and that there is no evidence 
in support of any subjective expectations set forth by the Murrs.106 
Additionally, the State disagrees with the Murrs’ contention that the 
separate acquisition dates of the Lots merit treating the Lots as 
separate parcels.107 The State further argues that the Murrs have in fact 
treated Lot E and Lot F as a single unit, citing evidence that “vacant” 
Lot E contains a propane tank, volleyball court, and access to the same 
stretch of beach.108 Alternative arguments include the claim being time 
barred and the Murrs failure to exhaust their administrative 
remedies.109 
V.  ANALYSIS 
The Court should hold for the Murrs and rule that Lot E is the 
relevant parcel to analyze whether the Ordinance effected a taking that 
requires just compensation. First, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals made 
a crucial factual error by stating that the 1995 transfer of Lot E brought 
the Lots under common ownership for the first time. Second, Penn 
Central’s “parcel as a whole” concept should not be interpreted to 
require courts to analyze takings claims by aggregating commonly 
owned but legally distinct properties. 
A.  Error by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals 
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals made a crucial factual error that 
underlies their rulings against the Murrs. Specifically, during the Murrs’ 
first appeal, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals implied that the 1995 
transfer of Lot E brought the Lots under common ownership for the 
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first time, resulting in a merger.110 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals 
confirmed this implication in the Murrs’ second appeal.111 Both the 
County and the State note that the Murrs’ parents had owned Lots E 
and F in their personal names from 1982 until 1994, when Lot F alone 
was transferred to the Murrs.112 Accordingly, the parents’ 1982 transfer 
of Lot F from their plumbing company to their personal names brought 
the Lots under common ownership and within the scope of the 
Ordinance.113 Theoretically, the Murrs’ parents should not have been 
allowed to separately transfer the Lots to the Murrs.114 
Given that the State and the County define the relevant parcel 
based on the property owner’s reasonable expectations of the state 
property law, the facts do not support their claim that the Murrs had an 
objectively reasonable expectation that the 1995 transfer of Lot E 
would result in the Murrs taking title to a single merged parcel.115 
Ironically, the County accuses the Murrs of “pick[ing] and choos[ing] 
among relevant state laws that define the scope of their property 
rights.”116 In fact, the County and the State are engaging in such 
behavior by deciding to prohibit the Murrs from selling or developing 
Lot E under the Ordinance, while arguing at the same time that the 
1982 transfer is irrelevant to the case at hand.117 Regardless of the 
merits of the County’s accusation, the fact that the Murrs’ parents were 
able to transfer Lot E and Lot F separately to the Murrs seemingly 
gives rise to the reasonable belief that the Murrs could do the same.118 
B.  Penn Central Does Not Require Aggregation of Commonly Owned 
Properties 
In addition to the factual error underpinning the Wisconsin Court 
of Appeals’ decision, Penn Central’s “parcel as a whole” concept does 
not require that courts analyze a takings claim by aggregating 
commonly owned, contiguous properties that are legally distinct from 
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one another. In Penn Central, a company alleged that a New York City 
law effected a taking of its property interest in the airspace above 
Grand Central Terminal.119 In denying the takings claim, the Court 
stated that “‘[t]akings’ jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel 
into discrete segments” but rather focuses on both “the character of the 
action and on the nature and extent of the interference with the rights 
in the parcel as a whole.”120 The New York City law did not effect a 
taking because the property owner attempted to “segment” the 
airspace from the rest of the fee property.121 
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals correctly stated that the parcel 
must be viewed as a whole, but misinterpreted Penn Central by 
aggregating the Murrs’ contiguous, commonly owned properties and 
analyzing the Murrs’ takings claim as an attempt to segment a single 
parcel.122 Penn Central can better be understood as standing for the 
principle that property owners cannot claim a compensable taking for 
a segmented portion of their property.123 While Penn Central may have 
caused confusion by defining the “parcel as a whole” as “the city tax 
block designated as the ‘landmark site,’” the Court did not suggest that 
the properties comprising the tax block were aggregated simply 
because they were contiguous parcels under common ownership.124 In 
contrast, Penn Central’s language emphasizes the relevant parcel is a 
“single parcel” rather than the aggregation of parcels.125 
CONCLUSION 
Only eight Justices will decide Murr, as arguments were heard on 
the same day the confirmation hearings began for Neil Gorsuch.126 
Gorsuch’s absence, a judge commonly compared to the late Justice 
Scalia, likely weighs in favor of the State and the County. Assuming 
Gorsuch shares Scalia’s embracement of the per se rule for total 
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takings, the State and the County will benefit from his absence because 
the Murrs’ success depends on the Court embracing the per se rule.127 
Additionally, Justice Kennedy’s opinions in takings clause cases 
indicate that he might be more receptive to the State’s and the County’s 
position than the rest of the conservative wing of the Court.128 
Regardless if the Court rules in favor of the Murrs or the State and the 
County, Murr v. Wisconsin provides the Court a crucial opportunity to 
clarify the rule for determining the “parcel as a whole.” 
127.  See Richard Wolf, ‘Scalia Index’ shines light on possible Trump Supreme Court Pick,
USA TODAY (Jan. 30, 2017), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/01/30/supreme-
court-trump-scalia-pryor-gorsuch/97057474. 
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concurring); Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1032–36 (1992) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
